Hayes, Glynn, and Shanahan (2005) defined self-censorship as the withholding of one's opinion around an audience perceived to disagree with that opinion. They argued that people differ in their willingness to self-censor and introduced an 8-item self-report instrument, the Willingness to Self-Censor scale, to measure this individual difference. The results of an experimental study presented here provide further evidence of the construct validity of the scale. Each participant in the study was presented with a hypothetical scenario that contained information suggesting a group of people the participant was conversing with about a controversial topic held opinions that were either uniformly similar to or different from the participant's own opinion. Four weeks prior, each participant had responded to the Willingness to Self-Censor scale and a measure of dispositional shyness. As expected, the manipulation of the climate of opinion affected willingness to express an opinion to the group, but more so among those who scored relatively high on the Willingness to Self-Censor scale. These results support the notion that some people rely on information about the climate of opinion more so than do others when they decide whether or not to voice their opinion publicly, and they suggest that the Willingness to Self-Censor scale measures this individual difference.
self-expression. Some argue that the theory is overly simplistic, in that it fails to acknowledge the multitude of factors that influence a person's choice to express an opinion or remain silent (e.g. Price & Allen, 1990; Salmon & Kline, 1985) . Furthermore, a meta-analysis of survey studies examining the relationship between perceptions of support for one's opinion and willingness to express that opinion publicly shows that the relation is weak at best (Glynn, Hayes, & Shahanan, 1997) . Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a spiral of silence can occur when social conditions are right, and the theory is and will likely continue to be one of the more influential and research inspiring theories of self-censorship in the field of public opinion. Hayes, Glynn, and Shanahan (2005) defined 'self-censorship' as the withholding of one's true opinion from an audience perceived to disagree with that opinion. They distinguished self-censorship from 'opinion expression inhibition', defined as a more general reticence to voice an opinion publicly. Unlike general opinion expression inhibition, self-censorship requires an active consideration of the climate of opinion prior to deciding whether to speak that opinion in a public forum. Motivated by the (typically) weak relationship between perceptions of support for one's opinion and willingness to speak out found in the spiral of silence literature (Glynn et al., 1997) , Hayes et al. (2005) argue that a failure to consider individual differences in people's willingness to self-censor may make a relationship that intuitively should be strong appear relatively weak or nonexistent. According to their argument, there exist 'facilitators' of silence spirals, who use information about the climate of opinion when deciding to speak an opinion, as well as 'inhibitors' of silence spirals, who say what they think regardless of the climate of opinion and the potential negative costs of appearing to support a minority viewpoint. By assuming that people are equally susceptible to the forces of the climate of opinion, analyses to date fail to capture what may be a more sizeable relationship between perceptions of the climate of opinion and opinion expression, at least among some people. Hayes et al. (2005) presented a case for conceptualizing willingness to selfcensor as an individual difference and introduced a self-report instrument to measure it: the Willingness to Self-Censor scale. This scale contains eight statements requiring a response on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale. Example statements include 'There have been many times when I thought others around me were wrong but I didn't let them know' and 'I'd feel uncomfortable if someone asked my opinion and I knew he or she wouldn't agree with me'. Local, statewide, and national probability samples show that the instrument yields reliable data, typically in the .7 to .8 range. They established the validity of the instrument by providing evidence that, as would be expected from theoretical arguments, self-censorers (i.e. those who score relatively high on the scale) tend to worry more about other people thinking negatively of them, are higher in public self-consciousness, are less argumentative, have relatively lower self-esteem, and are generally more shy or anxious about communication relative to 'self-expressors' (i.e. people who score relatively low on the scale). In spite of moderate to strong correlations with some of these constructs, Hayes et al. (2005) established through confirmatory factor analysis that the Willingness to SelfCensor scale yields data that are nevertheless statistically distinguishable from data resulting from the measurement of these related constructs. They propose that there is much to be gained by considering the interaction between personality and social contexts in the study of public opinion expression and suggest several lines of public opinion research that could be pursued using this measure.
The evidence presented by Hayes et al. (2005) is suggestive of the construct validity of the Willingness to Self-Censor scale and therefore its potential as a public opinion research tool, but it is not compelling. Although the Willingness to Self-Censor scale predicts other individual differences and is statistically distinguishable from them, the question lingers as to whether it predicts the behavior it is intended to predict, whether it does so better in the conditions in which it should better predict that behavior, and whether it does so independently of conceptually and statistically related constructs. Furthermore, their data do not inform the question as to whether this individual difference actually moderates the relationship between the climate of opinion and opinion expression. The study reported here attempts to answer these questions. Participants in this study were presented with a hypothetical 'train-test' like scenario commonly used in spiral of silence research and were subsequently asked how willing they would be to express their opinion in the situation they were given. Half of the participants were given a scenario in which the climate of opinion was described as hostile to their opinion, whereas the other half were told that the climate of opinion was friendly. Four weeks prior, the participants were administered the Willingness to Self-Censor scale and a measure of dispositional shyness.
The key test of construct validity is whether willingness to self-censor and the climate of opinion interact in predicting a person's willingness to express their true opinion in this situation. If the Willingness to Self-Censor scale is measuring a person's willingness or reticence to express his or her opinion in a hostile opinion climate, then the interaction should be consistent with the following patterns. First, the relationship between willingness to express one's true opinion and Willingness to Self-Censor should be more negative for participants assigned to the hostile climate than the friendly climate condition. That is, people who are higher in their willingness to self-censor should be less willing to express their true opinion, but this relationship should be stronger in the hostile opinion climate than in the friendly climate condition. This prediction stems from the fact that the Willingness to Self-Censor scale is explicitly designed to predict behavior in a specific situation (namely, a hostile opinion climate) and should be more predictive of behavior in that situation than in a different situation (a friendly climate). Second, the effect of the climate of opinion should be larger among those who
score relatively higher on the Willingness to Self-Censor scale. This pattern is expected because people high on the scale should be more sensitive to the climate of opinion than people lower on the scale if it is indeed measuring something more than just general reticence to express one's opinion regardless of the climate of opinion. Third, these patterns should exist independent of competing constructs. Finally, the interaction should be specific to Willingness to Self-Censor. There should be no similar interaction between dispositional shyness and the climate of opinion if the Willingness to Self-Censor scale is measuring something other than dispositional shyness. We pit the Willingness to Self-Censor scale against dispositional shyness in this study because it is the competing construct most strongly correlated with Willingness to Self-Censor in the data reported by Hayes et al. (2005) .
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
The participants in this experiment were 742 students enrolled in introductory communication courses at The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, USA (M age = 20.3, SD age = 2.12, 55 percent female).
PROCEDURE
The study took place over a one-month period in two stages. In the first stage, the students were administered a battery of self-report personality inventories at the beginning of the academic term in class. The respondents were asked not to include any identifying information on the questionnaire except for the last 5 digits of their social security number. This information was requested so that students who participated could be awarded extra credit in their course for their participation, and so that we could later match their responses to these inventories to their responses to the second stage of the study.
Included in this battery of inventories was the Willingness to Self-Censor scale and a 13-item measure of dispositional shyness (Cheek & Buss, 1981) . The Cheek and Buss shyness measure consists of a variety of questions designed to tap a person's anxiety and discomfort in social interaction. Example items include 'I feel tense when I am with other people I don't know', and 'I feel inhibited in social situations', to which participants respond on a 5-point Likert-scale. Hayes et al. (2005) reported a strong correlation between Willingness to Self-Censor and shyness, so shyness was measured in this study so that we could statistically partial out shyness from all statistical tests reported below. In this sample, both measures yielded reliable data (Willingness to Self-Censor: α = .83; Shyness: α = .88) and were moderately correlated (r = .62, p < .0001).
Approximately four weeks later, a different person returned to the courses to request the students' participation in a study in exchange for extra course credit. The students were not reminded of their participation in the earlier data collection stage, and the earlier study was never mentioned.
1 This second study requested the students to read a hypothetical scenario they were presented with and to respond to a series of questions about how they would respond in this situation. The study took place at the end of the class, immediately following the completion of an examination scheduled for that day. After turning in their exam, the students who chose to participate where handed a package containing the scenario and the response measures, and they returned to their seat to complete the study at their own pace.
EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO
The scenario described a party the participants were asked to imagine that they were attending. They were told that they were listening to a group of people discussing a controversial topic, and that members of the group at the party were expressing their opinions about the topic. The climate of opinion was experimentally manipulated in the scenario. Roughly half of the participants were told that the discussants expressed opinions about the topic during the discussion that were uniformly different from the participant's (hostile climate condition). The remaining participants were told that the discussants expressed opinions that were uniformly consistent with the participant's (friendly climate condition). The scenario did not explicitly state what the opinions being expressed were, and at no point did we ask the participants their own opinions. The scenario simply stated that the opinions expressed were either uniformly consistent or inconsistent with the participant's, whatever that opinion might be. The participants were randomly assigned to either the friendly or hostile climate condition. A verbatim example of the situation as described in writing to the participants can be found in the Appendix.
Three different scenarios were used that varied only with respect to the topic being discussed, and participants were randomly assigned to which of the three they actually received. One third of the participants were told that the group was discussing a recent execution by the state and whether capital punishment should be outlawed (death penalty issue). A third of the participants were provided a scenario in which the topic of discussion revolved around whether the university administration should use a student's race when deciding on funding decisions (affirmative action issue). The remaining third of the participants read a scenario in which the people were conversing about a recent event near campus where a sport utility vehicle was vandalized by members of a group of environmental activists and whether such behavior was an appropriate form of political protest (SUV destruction issue). After reading this description, the participants were asked to imagine that a member of the group turned to him or her for information about what he or she thought about this issue. The response variable used in the analysis, willingness to speak out, was provided in response to a question 'How likely would you be to express your true opinion to the group' on a 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (very likely) scale.
RESULTS
A hierarchical regression was conducted to estimate willingness to express one's true opinion. At the first stage we entered a variable coding the climate of opinion (0 = friendly, 1 = hostile), issue of discussion (dummy coded using the SUV vandalization issue as the reference category), sex (0 = female, 1 = male), willingness to self-censor, and shyness. At a second stage, the interaction between willingness to self-censor and climate of opinion was added to the model. 2 This interaction was represented in the model as the product of the dummy variable coding the climate of opinion condition and the person's score on the willingness to selfcensor scale.
The variables entered at the first stage of the regression accounted for 16 percent of the variability in willingness to speak an opinion. On the whole, participants were generally willing to express their true opinion (M = 4.23, SD = 0.91). But as can be seen in Table 1 , the participants reported a greater willingness to express their true opinion in a friendly opinion climate (adjusted M = 4.39) than in a hostile climate (adjusted M = 4.10). Furthermore, males (adjusted M = 4.33) were more likely than females (adjusted M = 4.17) to say they'd express their true opinion. The Willingness to Self-Censor scale predicted opinion expression as well, with those scoring relatively higher saying they'd be less willing to express their opinion. But shyness was unrelated to willingness to speak out after controlling for the other predictors in the model. Finally, different issues prompted different degrees of willingness to express an opinion, F(2, 735) = 3.73, p <.05. Specifically, participants were less willing to express their true opinion about the appropriateness of SUV vandalizing as a form of protest (adjusted M = 4.14) than they were about the death penalty (adjusted M = 4.35) but not about affirmative action (adjusted M = 4.25).
But of primary interest in this study was whether the interaction between willingness to self-censor and the climate of opinion explained additional betweenparticipant variation in willingness to speak out and whether the nature of the interaction was consistent with the predictions described above. As can be seen in Table 1 , the interaction was statistically significant, and the direction of the interaction was consistent with what would be expected if the willingness to selfcensor scale is truly measuring a person's willingness to withhold their opinions as a function of the climate of opinion. This interaction is depicted graphically in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 1 . There are two interpretations of this interaction. First, as expected, after controlling for all other variables in the model, the effect of willingness to self-censor on opinion expression was larger and more negative in the hostile opinion climate (b = −0.56, r = −.33, p < .001) than in the friendly climate condition (b = −0.37, r = −.23, p < .001). Second, the effect of the climate of opinion differed systematically as a function of the participants' willingness to self-censor. We probed this interpretation of the interaction using the procedure described by Aiken and West (1991) and Hayes (2005) by estimating the effect of the climate of opinion at the sample mean willingness to selfcensor (2.56), as well as one standard deviation above the mean (3.23) and one standard deviation below the mean (1.90). At the mean willingness to self-censor, 
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speaking out was more likely in the friendly climate than the hostile climate (b = 0.28, p <.001). The effect of the climate of opinion was even larger one standard deviation above the sample mean (b = 0.40, p <.001) but smaller and only marginally significant one standard deviation below the mean (b = 0.16, p =.07).
To assess whether this interaction was specific to willingness to self-censor, we repeated this analysis but instead entered the interaction between shyness and climate of opinion at the second stage. The interaction was not even close to statistically significant (ΔR 2 = .002, F = 1.43, p > .20). So people who differ in their FIGURE 1 Graphical depiction of the interaction between willingness to self-censor and the climate of opinion in estimating willingness to express one's true opinion to a group willingness to self-censor differ in the effect of the climate of opinion on their willingness to speak out, but people who differ in dispositional shyness do not, suggesting that willingness to self-censor is not just a measure of shyness or comfort in social situations requiring interpersonal communication. Instead, it differentially predicts opinion expression depending on the climate of opinion. An additional set of exploratory analyses was conducted to see if the climate of opinion interacted with either issue or sex in predicting willingness to express an opinion. No interactions were found. We also assessed whether the nature of the interaction between willingness to self-censor and climate of opinion differed across issues. These interactions are plotted for each issue in Figure 1 . Notice that the interaction was consistent in its appearance across all three issues.
Although the interaction appears to vary somewhat across issues, there was no statistical evidence that the size or sign of the interaction varied any more than would be expected by chance. That is, there was no three way interaction between willingness to self-censor, climate of opinion, and topic of discussion.
DISCUSSION
Here and elsewhere , we have conceptualized willingness to self-censor as a relatively stable attribute of the person, reflecting his or her general proclivity to refrain from expressing an opinion in a hostile opinion climate. Some people are more likely to use information about the climate of opinion when deciding whether or not to voice their opinion, and we argue that the Willingness to Self-Censor scale taps into this individual difference and its general manifestation across situations. The results of this study are consistent with our claim of the construct validity of the willingness to self-censor scale, in that it distinguishes between people who are more vs. those who are less affected by the climate of opinion. Furthermore, it more accurately predicts behavior in a situation it was designed to predict (behavior in hostile climates) than it does in a different situation (behavior in friendly climates), and it does so even after controlling for dispositional shyness. Finally, the results of this study are consistent with our earlier claim ) that the weak relationship between perceptions of the climate of opinion and opinion expression can be attributed at least in part to a failure to acknowledge individual differences in how much a person considers and uses information about the climate of opinion when deciding whether or not to speak out.
We do not argue, however, that the self-censorer (i.e. someone who scores relatively high on the WTSC scale) will always choose self-censorship over selfexpression. There are many factors that affect opinion expression, and people who might normally choose to self-censor may nevertheless speak up on topics that are especially important, involving, or interesting to them or in situations in which they feel comfortable and safe expressing a dissenting opinion. Furthermore, the study reported here provides no evidence about temporal consistency in a person's decisions to self-censor. All we have demonstrated is that the climate of opinion has a bigger effect on opinion expression in a group of people scoring relatively high on the WTSC scale compared to a group that has relatively low scores. These results illustrate that the willingness to self-censor scale can be used to estimate the relative size of effect of the climate of opinion among groups of people who score relatively high vs. low. In short, our results describe a between-person phenomenon, not a within-person phenomenon. Nevertheless, knowing that information about the climate of opinion has a larger effect among those who score relatively high on the WTSC scale allows for the inferential leap that, all other things being equal, a person who scores high is more likely than a person who scores low to consider and use information about the climate of opinion when deciding to voice his or her opinion or not.
It is worth discussing what evidence would further support the validity of the Willingness to Self-Censor scale as a measure of a person's cross-situational tendency to self-censor, whether self-censorers are more likely to attend to and use information about the climate of opinion, and what studies designed to generate such evidence could look like. Studies of temporal consistency would have to ask people how they would behave in several different situations that vary in the distribution of the climate of opinion as well as the topic or issue in question. Using such a methodology, it would be possible to quantify how much each person's opinion expression is affected by manipulations of the climate of opinion across situations. We argue that the Willingness to Self-Censor Scale should predict the size of that effect measured within-person. But such a study would only indirectly suggest that self-censorers are more attentive to or are more likely to consider information about the climate of opinion when choosing whether or not to speak an opinion. Using recall measures or think-aloud methods, people who score relatively high on the willingness to self-censor scale should be more likely to accurately recall the climate of opinion in the scenarios they are given, or would be more likely to mention information about the climate of opinion when they are asked to articulate the factors they used when deciding whether or not to speak out.
Such studies would be relatively easy to do. But does the willingness to selfcensor scale predict individual differences in actual behavior as a function of the climate of opinion? Answering this question requires substantially more effort, and studies of this sort are underway. In addition to the lack of consideration for individual differences, the use of hypothetical situations in a survey context to test spiral of silence theory has no doubt led in part to the counterintuitive metaanalytic finding (e.g. Glynn et al., 1997) that the climate of opinion has at best a weak effect on opinion expression. As we report above, most people, when asked, say they would express their true opinion in the situation they were presented with. Whether they actually would, why if not, and what people do to avoid expressing an opinion when it is requested is an empirical question that remains largely unanswered. So the study reported here suffers from the same limitation as many in the spiral of silence literature in its reliance on hypothetical scenarios to measure opinion expression. To be sure, such studies have been helpful to our understanding and worth doing, but public opinion researchers interested in public opinion expression should consider following the example of McDevitt, Kiousis, and Wahl-Jorgensen (2003) by measuring actual rather than hypothetical opinion expression. Only by putting people in real communication situations involving real discussion will we be able to develop accurate models of what affects opinion expression and how. Such studies will help to further our understanding of the complex interplay between personality, situations, construal of those situations, and the public expression of opinions.
APPENDIX
The scenario below is a verbatim copy of one of the scenarios presented to the participants. The climate of opinion manipulation is presented in brackets and bold. The three topics were similar, varying only in the content of the discussion (death penalty, affirmative action, SUV destruction).
Consider the following hypothetical situation. As you read through the description of this situation, imagine that you are actually in this situation as the events unfold. Imagine what you'd be seeing, and what you would be feeling as you read through this description.
You are at a campus party on the weekend. You recognize some people at the party from classes that you have taken, and there are a few familiar faces that you just can't place but you've definitely seen around campus. Overall, however, you don't know people there. You walk over to a group of people and join a discussion about how the quarter is going, your impressions of the party, and other standard party chit-chat. You occasionally contribute to the discussion, but mostly you are just listening. At one point during the discussion, someone in the group tells a story about how he walked out of his apartment this morning and across the street was his neighbor's SUV, and it had been vandalized over night. The tires were slashed, the windows broken, the doors were kicked in and dented, and there was graffiti spray painted all over the SUV containing the slogans of various pro-environment organizations. The people in the group start discussing forms of environmental activism. It is apparent as you are listening to this discussion that everyone in the group [disagrees/agrees] with your opinion about whether such forms of vandalism are justified in the name of promoting environmental conservation. That is, they seem to have [a different opinion than you do/the same opinion as you do] about the appropriateness of such a form of protest and advocacy. Then one of the people in the group turns to you and asks you what your opinion is about this. You now have to decide how you will respond.
Listed below are a number of ways that people might choose to respond to this situation. Consider the list below and evaluate each of the options with respect to how likely you would be to respond in that way if you were actually in this situation. To make these evaluations, imagine you were in the situation and how you would be feeling and what you would be thinking. Then circle a number from 1 to 5 indicating how likely you would be to respond that way in this situation. If you would be very unlikely to respond that way, circle 1. If you would be very likely to respond that way, circle 5. Use any number between 1 and 5 for your response, such that a higher number reflects a greater likelihood that you would respond in that way. Please complete this task for each of the possible responses below.
